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Abstract
This paper analyzes a multi-auction setting in which informed strategic agents are endowed
with heterogeneous noisy signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset. One result is that
when the variance of the noise is small the competition between traders takes the form of a rat
race during all the periods of trading. As we increase the level of the noise in the traders’ signals,
a waiting game phase appears and the intensity of the rat race, observed only at the last auctions,
decreases. In sharp contrast with the previous literature, when the variance of the noise is very
large, we only observe a waiting game.
JEL Classification: G14-G24-D43-D82
Keywords: efficiency, asymmetric information, noise, liquidity, adverse selection, competition.
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1 Introduction
Analyzing the strategic trading behavior of informed traders in a dynamic setting is the
focus of a large body of literature in Finance. Different frameworks are used in order to
perform that task. The seminal paper by Kyle (1985) examines the trading behavior of a
single perfectly informed trader. The paper shows that the monopolistic trader will limit
the size of his early trades in order not to reveal too much information too early. This leads
to information being gradually incorporated into prices. That result depends on some cru-
cial assumptions such as the presence of a single informed trader but also on the structure of
the private information i.e. whether it is perfect or not. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)
show, to the contrary of Kyle (1985), that the competition resulting from the presence of
more than one informed trader with identical information results in almost all the private
information to be revealed in the early auctions.1 Foster and Viswanathan (1996) analyze
the case of imperfect competition when the traders’ information is correlated. Aggregate
private information gives then the liquidation value of the risky asset. Back, Cao and
Willard (2000) study the competition between strategic traders in continuous time. Both
papers show that the result of the competition between informed traders is very complex
and depends critically on the initial correlation between the informed traders’ signals.
In our paper, we revisit the competition between heterogeneously informed strategic
traders. However, as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), we assume that each trader is
endowed with a noisy normally distributed signal about the liquidation value of the risky
asset v˜. This allows us to know the structure of information of all trades.
Given that framework, we derive the unique linear equilibrium in a multi-auction mar-
ket where traders receive heterogenous signals. It allows us to study the convergence
of prices to the liquidation value of the risky asset, knowing the exact structure of the
heterogeneity in the beliefs of the insiders.
Our article aims at answering the following questions:
1Michener and Tighe (1991), Foster and Viswanathan (1993) find the same result.
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• What dynamic strategies should informed market participants use to maximize their
profits? How does the reaction of the informed agents evolve over time according to
their private signals and prices?
• How quickly does the price adjust to reflect the presence of informed traders?
• How are the insiders’ profits affected by noisy private signals? Can informed traders
reduce competition when they have noisy private signals i.e. can noisy information
be profitable for informed traders?
• Is there an optimal level of noise that maximize traders’ profits?
Considering the effect of the variance of the noise on the traders’ behavior is not equiva-
lent to considering the effect of the correlation between signals. A change in the correlation
between signals only measures the degree to which signals are identical or not. A change in
the variance of the noise in the traders’ signals does not only affect the correlation between
the traders’ signals, but also the correlation of the traders’ signals with the liquidation
value of the asset. Then, changing the level of the noise simultaneously affects the cor-
relation between the traders’ signals and the correlation with the liquidation value of the
asset. Indeed, a large variance of the noise leads to a lower correlation between signals.
This implies a reduction of the level of competition by giving each trader a monopolis-
tic position on his private information and thus prevents competition from destroying his
profits. However, it also implies that informed agents are trading on noise which in turn
reduces their expected profits. This effect is not captured by looking at the effect of the
correlation between signals.
Furthermore, our framework enables us to study the trade-off between noise and compe-
tition in a dynamic setting highlighted in Dridi and Germain (2009).2 When the number of
traders is greater than four and for some values of the noise, they obtain that the traders
get more profits with noisy information than with perfect information leading to noise
2The model of Dridi and Germain (2009) is a particular case of our model corresponding to a static
setting.
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acting as a commitment not to trade. In our paper, we also study that trade-off in a
dynamic setting and, as such competition encompasses two dimensions: one temporal i.e.
the number of auctions and one spatial i.e. the number of informed traders.
Our main results are the following:
• The existence of a linear equilibrium is not always guaranteed. We find that the
trading process continues as long as informed traders retain some private information
not incorporated in the market maker’s information set. We also find that the values
of the noise (measured by the variance of noise in the traders signal) that guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium are limited by the level of competition between traders.
• When the competition is strong (the number of informed traders and/or the number
of auctions is high), increasing the noise in the traders’ private information leads
to higher profits than when that noise is small. In that case, traders can make
more profits with noisy information than with perfect information. However, adding
too much noise in the traders’ signals always decreases their profits. When the
level of competition is not as strong, noise always reduces the profit of the informed
traders. These results generalize the findings of Dridi and Germain (2009) previously
highlighted.
• The optimal noise (i.e. maximizing the informed traders’ expected profits) increases
with the number of traders and with the number of auctions. Moreover, as in Dridi
and Germain (2009) the optimal aggregate profit has a strictly positive finite limit
when the number of traders is large.
• The optimal individual profit has a strictly positive finite limit when the number of
auctions is large.
The highlighted trade-off between noise and competition bears some similarities with
the results put forward by Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000) regarding
the level of correlation of the signals and the expected profits of the traders. Indeed, Foster
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and Viswanathan (1996) show that the expected profits of the traders are higher when there
is some positive correlation compared to the case where the signals are uncorrelated. In our
model, we concentrate on the level of noise and noise diminishes the correlation between
private signals. We also show that noise can, in some cases, increase expected profits.
Ostrovsky (2012) highlights that in dynamics models the most important issue is the
aggregation of information. In Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back, Cao and Willard
(2000) the dispersed information forms a sufficient statistic and prices converge to the
liquidation value. In our model, prices do not, in general, converge to the liquidation
value of the risky asset. However, we show that, when the number of informed traders
increases indefinitely, prices tend to converge to the liquidation value. Moreover, the rate
of the increase for the price informativeness is lower in our model than in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992), as noise slows down the revelation of information.
Both Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000) find that market compe-
tition depends on the initial correlation between the informed traders’ signals. When the
correlation is not too strong, the competition has two phases. Firstly, insiders trade very
aggressively and release much of their private information in the earlier trading periods.
This phase is known as the “rat race”. Secondly, since the correlation between the residual
private information of the informed traders evolves over time, after a number of auctions
the insiders’ residual information is negatively correlated between each other. This reflects
a difference of opinion between the informed agents about the final value of the risky asset.
The informed participants then become more reluctant to trade, since each insider could
be on the wrong side of the market. Hence, the trading activity is less intense. This phase
is known as the “waiting game”. During that phase, insiders conceal their private informa-
tion. This phenomenon leads to an adverse selection problem in the market at the end of
the trading day. Hence, the competition between the insiders does not automatically lead
to more efficient prices as one approaches the time of liquidation. We also show that it is
possible to have the reverse sequence of the two stages (first a rat race and then a waiting
game).
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Looking at the trader’s behavior, we obtain the following results. When the trader’s
private information is quite precise (strong correlation between the trader’s signal), the
dynamic competition between traders takes the form of a rat race (where traders trade
very aggressively on their private information) during all the periods of trading. This result
generalizes the findings of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), for the range of low levels
of noise.3 However, when the private information is very noisy we only obtain a waiting
game. This result is in sharp contrast to Foster and Viswanathan (1996). Indeed, they
find that the waiting game is followed by a rat race. In this case, the insiders limit their
orders since their private information is noisy. The waiting game observed in our model
is not due to a negative correlation between the signals as a consequence of trading. We
show that, in our model, the waiting game phase appears when the correlation between
the signals of the traders is low - but positive.
Some papers have empirically investigated the competition between informed traders
taking place in financial markets. Ellison and Mullin (2007) find that the information is
gradually incorporated into price confirming the result found in Kyle (1985). Cho (2007)
analyses the behavior of stock prices ahead of earnings announcements. The paper finds
evidence of informed trading. However, the evidence is more consistent with Foster and
Viswanathan (1996) than with Kyle (1985). Our model predicts that changes in volume
during the trading day can be explained by the presence of noise in the information of the
traders when they compete in the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, presents the general
setup. We show in section 3 the existence and the uniqueness of a linear equilibrium
and characterize the different parameters at each auction. In section 4, we study the
informativeness, the market depth and the expected profits according to the level of noise
in the signals of the informed traders, the number of auctions and the number of traders.
Finally, in section 5, we make some concluding remarks. All proofs are gathered in the
3We show that the models of Kyle (1985) (discrete setting) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) are
encompassed in our model leading to the same results for some particular parameters values.
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Appendix.
2 The Model
We follow, in this paper, the notation of Kyle (1985) and Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992). We assume that a risky security is traded during N sequential auctions in a time
interval which begins at t = 0 and ends at t = 1. Let ∆t be the time interval between the
nth auction and the previous auction (∆t = 1N ). At t = 1, the liquidation value of the
asset is revealed. This liquidation value is denoted by v˜, with v˜ ∼ N(v¯, σ2v). For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume v¯ = 0. In each auction, the following market
participants are present:
• M risk-neutral informed traders. At t = 0 each insider i = 1, . . . ,M receives a sig-
nal S˜i = v˜ + ˜i about the liquidation value of the risky asset, where ˜i ∼ N(0, σ2 ),
for i = 1, . . . ,M . Moreover, we assume that the error terms, ˜i, are mutually in-
dependent. Informed participants receive heterogeneous signals as in Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988).
• Several liquidity traders who submit orders at each auction. They do not possess
any information about the fundamental value of the risky asset. We denote by ∆u˜n
their aggregate orders and we assume that (∆u˜n) are independently and identically
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2u∆t. Also, we assume that ∆u˜n
and v˜ are independent.
• Competitive risk-neutral market makers who observe the aggregate orders, but who
do not know whether these orders stem from liquidity traders or insiders, and set the
price pn, at each auction n in a Bayesian way.
At the nth auction we denote ∆X˜n as the aggregate order of all informed traders, and
pii,n the total expected profit of informed trader i, for i = 1, . . . ,M , from auction n to
auction N .
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Each risk neutral informed trader determines his optimal trading strategy by a process
of backward induction in order to maximize his expected profits given his conjectures about
the trading strategies of the other informed traders. We look for a linear equilibrium where
each informed trader chooses an order which is linear in his private information and the
previous public price.
Competition in market making drives the market makers’ expected profits to zero,
conditional on the aggregate submitted orders w˜n = ∆X˜n + ∆u˜n. Thus, at the nth
auction, pn equals the expected value of v˜ conditional on the information available. The
market makers’ prices are linear in the observed prevailing aggregate order flow and the
previous public price.
3 Equilibrium
Let x˜in be the order of agent i at auction n. Given the linear assumption of the equilibrium,
the order is such that xˆin = (αi,nS˜i + βnpn−1)∆t. After n− 1 periods of trading, trader i
maximizes his remaining expected profit from the nth auction to the last one.
At the nth auction, the market maker receives the aggregate order flow w˜n =
∑M
i=1 x˜in+
∆u˜n. Based on this aggregate order flow, the market maker updates, in a Bayesian way,
her estimate of the fundamental value of the risky asset:
pn = E[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, w˜n] = pn−1 + λnw˜n,
where λn is the liquidity parameter at the nth auction. It is the regression coefficient of
v˜ on w˜n conditional on w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, the past trades. Hence, the price set by the risk
neutral market makers, at each auction n, pn, is equal to the conditional expectation of v˜
given the information generated by the aggregate order process up to time t = nN .
Given the order form and the price function, the trader’s conditional expected profit
can be written as:
E[piin|p0, . . . , pn−1, S˜i] = k1,n−1S˜2i + k2,n−1pn−1S˜i + k3,n−1p2n−1 + δn−1,
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where all parameters are given in the Appendix as part of the proof of the next proposition.4
This value function is similar to that of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992).5
We now introduce the equilibrium concept used in our model. To start, we define the
conditions to be satisfied for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we restrict our search to
linear Markov equilibrium and conjecture the equilibrium strategies for the market maker
and informed traders.
Just before period n, the information of insider i consists of his own signal S˜i, plus his
own orders (x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1). In addition, all insiders know the past net trades (w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1).
Let
x˜in = Xin(S˜i, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1),
pn = Pn(w˜1, . . . , w˜n)
represent the optimal strategy of trader i and the optimal strategy of the market maker,
respectively. Finally, let Xi = (Xi1, . . . , XiN ) (for each i) and P = (P1, . . . , PN ) represent
the two vectors of strategy functions. Define the profit that accrues to informed trader i
from period n on as:
piin(X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , XM , P ) =
N∑
k=n
(v˜ − pk)x˜ik.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game is a M + 1 vector of strategies
(X1, . . . , XM , P ) such that (we follow Kyle (1985) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996)
4We assume here that all insiders play their equilibrium strategies, this expression should be modified
if we assume that trader i plays an arbitrary strategy, see appendix for more details.
5In Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), all insiders have the same signal, v˜, implying that the value
function of the informed trader i is:
E[piin|p0, . . . , pin−1, S˜i] = αn−1(v˜ − pn−1)2 + δn−1
We thus obtain this last value function by setting k1,n−1 = k3,n−1 = αn−1 and k2,n−1 = −2αn−1 in
our model. Our proof is similar to the one of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) except that we specify the
equilibrium conditions for heterogeneously noisy signals.
10
closely):
• For any i = 1, . . . ,M , n = 1, . . . , N and for X ′i = (X ′i1, . . . , X ′in, . . . , X ′iN ), we have:
E[piin(X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , XM , P )|S˜i, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1]
≥ E[piin(X1, . . . , X ′i, . . . , XM , P )|S˜i, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1].
The optimal strategy function for informed trader i is best no matter which past
strategies i may have been played.
• For all n = 1, . . . , N , we have:
pn = E[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n].
Also, we define the variance of the price error Σn, a measure of price informativeness,
at auction n:
Σn = var[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n] (3.1)
The market maker sets prices equal to the conditional expected value given the order
flow.
We look for a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on a dynamic programming
argument. Note that the strategy of informed trader i at auction n is required to be
the optimal strategy, not only when trader i plays his optimal strategy in the first n − 1
periods. Furthermore, as in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), there are no off equilibrium
observations of order flow by the other informed traders in the model as every order flow
path is possible.
We now derive the following proposition which provides the different parameters of the
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If ΣN >
σ2
M
6 there exists a unique linear equilibrium with noisy private
information in which the demand function of informed trader i at auction n and the price
6Expressing equilibrium condition as a function of ΣN is equivalent to express the same condition as
a function of Σ0. Indeed, we solve our equilibrium by a process of backward induction i.e. we set the
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function at auction n are respectively equal to:7
xˆi,n = αn∆tS˜i + βn∆tpˆn−1. (3.2)
pˆn = pˆn−1 + λn(∆Xn + ∆un), (3.3)
where the parameters are defined by the following equations
αn∆t = −
2(k3n − 12k4n)λn − an
(M + 1)λn − 2M(k3n − 12k4n)λ2n
+
M − 1
M
ψn(1−an)
1− 2λn(k3n − 12k4n)
(M + 1)λn − 2M(k3n − 12k4n)λ2n
,
(3.4)
λn =
Mαn∆tΣn−1
(αn∆t)2M2Σn−1 + σ2u∆t+M(αn∆t)2σ2
. (3.5)
Σn = var[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n] =
Σn−1
(
σ2u∆t+M(αn∆t)
2σ2
)
(αn∆t)2M2Σn−1 + σ2u∆t+M(αn∆t)2σ2
. (3.6)
with an =
Σn
Σn+(1−ψn)σ2ε , ψn = Mλnαn∆t and
δn−1 = δn + λ2nk3n[σ
2
u∆t+ (αn∆t)
2(M − 1)(1 + (M − 1)an)σ2 ]. (3.7)
Trader i’s value function is given by
E
[
piin
∣∣∣pˆ0, ..., pˆn−1, S˜i ] = k1,n (S˜i − pˆn−1)+ δn. (3.8)
The coefficients k’s are solving the following system of equations (fully defined in the Ap-
pendix)
kn−1 = Akn + C, (3.9)
where kn−1, kn are matrices of dimension 6 × 1, A is a matrix with dimension 6 × 6 and
C is of dimension 6 × 1. All matrices are defined in the Appendix. The parameters are
subject to the following boundary conditions
δN = k1,N = k2,N = k3,N = 0, (3.10)
αN∆t =
aN
λN (2 + (M − 1) aN ) . (3.11)
value of ΣN , then we compute ΣN−1 . . . Σ0. Hence, we can write Σ0 as a bijective function of = ΣN -we
observe numerically that Σ0 is a strictly increasing function of ΣN - and the equilibrium condition could be
interpreted as a condition on Σ0.
7If σ2 = 0,we are in the Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) model, the results in this case are presented
in the appendix.
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Proof: See Appendix.
The necessary condition is a learning process condition. It means that the trading
process continues as long as informed traders still have some private information that is
not yet incorporated in the market maker’s information set. It also shows that the precision
of the market maker’s information is limited by the level of noise contained in the traders’
signals. In fact, we know that the market makers’ estimate of the liquidation value can be
written as:
vˆ =
1
M
M∑
i=1
S˜i = v˜ +
1
M
M∑
i=1
˜i. (3.12)
Suppose that the traders’ signals (S˜i)1≤i≤M are in the information set of the market
maker. In this case, the market maker is able to know the liquidation value v˜ with a
precision measured by the inverse of the variance of the random variable 1M
∑M
i=1 ˜i. That
precision is then equal to σ
2

M and represents the best precision of her estimate of the
liquidation value v˜. The last error variance of price, ΣN , is then greater than
σ2ε
M . As a
consequence, the level of noise, as measured by the variance of the noise σ2ε cannot be too
high.
Moreover, we find, numerically, that if we increase the frequency of trading N , we need
to set lower values of ΣN to maintain the same Σ0.
8 That allows us to deduce that the
frequency of trading is limited by the level of noise. The higher the frequency of trading,
the lower the level of noise. Regarding the effect of the number of insiders M , it is not
as clear. Increasing the number of insiders M decreases the lower bound of the necessary
condition. However, it also intensifies the competition between traders and so lead to lower
values of ΣN . Hence, we cannot deduct analytically the effect of increasing the number of
informed traders.
By proceeding by backward induction one determines the individual orders for each
auction. There is then a link between the last error variance of price ΣN and the initial one
Σ0 at the opening of the sequential auctions market. Choosing Σ0 is therefore equivalent
8This is due to the fact that increasing the frequency of trading intensifies the competition between
traders leading to more information being released and so to lower values of ΣN .
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to setting ΣN at a certain value. To illustrate the properties of our model, we compute
the linear equilibrium parameters for different settings.
All the results in the following sections are obtained numerically.
4 Numerical Results
We now illustrate our model with numerical simulations. In order to compare the different
results we choose similar numerical settings to those of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992),
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000). The results are simulated for a
fixed initial value of Σ0.
4.1 Informativeness and liquidity
We are interested in how prices aggregate the different pieces of private information held
by informed traders. In the next result, we study the informativeness of prices.
Numerical result 1 When the level of noise in the traders’ signals is low, prices incor-
porate quickly all the traders’ private information. When the signals become noisier the
decay of Σn becomes slower and less information is acquired by the market maker during
trading.
In our model, the conditional correlation between the signals of the informed market
participants cannot be negative. As a consequence, traders trade on the same side of the
market. Nevertheless, that competition is softened as traders have noisy signals. We can
compare our model to that of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) by looking at the correlation
between the signals. The correlation between the informed agents’ private signals, i and j
at time n, is given by:
corr(S˜i, S˜j)n =
Σn
Σn + σ2
for i 6= j. (4.1)
It can be seen from this expression that the value of σ2 impacts the correlation between
two signals. This correlation affects the traders’ behavior, which in turn impacts price
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informativeness. However, the variance of the noise also affects the traders’ behavior
independently from its effect on the correlation. Noisier (more precise) signals also implies
that informed agents, ceteris paribus, trade more (less) on noise reducing (increasing) price
informativeness.
In Figures 1 and 2, we represent the error variance of prices over time for different
values of the correlation between the signals of the informed traders (given by σ2 ).
Figure 1: The error variance of prices (Σn)
over time, M = 2, N = 4, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 2: The error variance of prices (Σn)
over time, M = 2, N = 50, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 1 shows that the error variance of price Σn decreases more slowly when the
variance of the noise, σ2 , is large. In other words, the noisier the signal the less information
is revealed during the periods of trading. Figure 1 also shows that, when the trader’s
private information is not too noisy, investors reveal more of their private information in
the early auctions whereas the opposite is true when private information is very noisy.
These effects can be explained as follows: when the level of noise is low, traders compete
more aggressively on their private information and so release the largest part of their
information in the early periods of trading, but when the level of noise is high, each trader
prefers to delay his trades and keeps most of his private information to the last auctions.
These effects are shown numerically in Figure 2.
In the next result, we study the liquidity in the market.
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Numerical result 2 The liquidity parameter λn is non monotonic with σ
2
 . It decreases
over time when the level of noise is low. When the level of noise is large, it increases over
time.
Figure 3: The liquidity parameter (λn) over
time, M = 2, N = 4, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 4: The liquidity parameter (λn) over
time, M = 2, N = 50, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 3 displays the dynamic of the liquidity parameter as a function of the noise. It
shows that as more information is incorporated into prices, the less aggressively the market
maker prices the asset. It also shows that, when there is a large level of noise in the private
signals, the market maker’s sensitivity to order flow, λn, increases slowly through time.
This is due to the fact that, in that case, informed traders delay their trades to the last
auctions and do not reveal a large part of their private information. Hence, the market
maker cannot learn much about the liquidation value of the asset in the early periods of
trading and she reacts more aggressively to the order flow that appears in the last periods
of trading. These results are shown numerically in Figure 4.
We now focus on the link between the informativeness of prices and the number of
auctions. Figure 5 shows the informativeness of prices for different values of the number of
auctions. In order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for the different parameter
configurations, we take σ2 = 0.02.
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Hence, one can observe that for a fixed level of noise, σ2 , the informativeness of prices
increases with the number of auctions.
Figure 5: The error variance of prices (Σn)
for different values of N , M = 2, σ2 = 0.02,
σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 6: The liquidity parameter (λn) for
different values of N , M = 2, σ2 = 0.02, σ
2
u =
1, Σ0 = 1.
Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the adverse selection problem (measured by the param-
eter λn) decreases with the number of auctions as one approaches the end of the trading
day. It also shows that the larger the number of auctions, the higher the price is at the
first auction.
Figures 7 and 8 show the links between the informativeness of prices and the number
of traders, and between the liquidity and the number of traders. One can see that for a
fixed level of noise, the informativeness of prices increases with the number of traders.
Also, we observe from Figure 8 that the liquidity parameter λn decreases with the
number of traders. Then, we conclude that increasing the number of traders or auctions
boosts the competition between traders and so leads to the release of more information to
the market maker.
We now study the reaction of the traders to their private and public information, and
present the different regimes of competition between traders.
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Figure 7: The error variance of prices (Σn)
for different values of M , N = 4, σ2 = 0.02,
σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 8: The liquidity parameter (λn) for
different values of M , N = 4, σ2 = 0.02, σ
2
u =
1, Σ0 = 1.
4.2 Competition: The rat race and the waiting game
We are interested in how noise affects the competition between informed traders. In the
next result, we study the reaction of informed traders to their public and private informa-
tion.
Numerical result 3 The informed market participants react more to both their private
and public information as time elapses. When the level of noise is low, the informed traders
react aggressively to their private and public information and increase significantly their
orders in the last periods of trading. The reaction of informed traders becomes less agressive
when the level of noise increases. Hence, when the level of noise is large, informed traders
react less aggressively to their information during all the periods of trading.
These results are shown in Figures 9 and 10.
Figures 9 and 10 show that the informed traders trade gradually more aggressively on
both their private and public information. It can be seen that the more precise the signal
the more aggressive the traders are. This aggressive trading is what we call a rat race.
When the level of noise is low, we observe a rat race during all the periods of trading.
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Figure 9: The reaction of an informed in-
vestor to his private signal (αn) over time,
M = 2, N = 4, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 10: The reaction of an informed in-
vestor to the prices (βn) over time, M = 2,
N = 4, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
As the level of noise increases, the intensity of this rat race decreases. In the presence of
high noise, traders are not aggressive in their trading during the early periods of trading,
we call that a waiting game. However, we still have a rat race in the last periods of
trading. Regarding the traders’ behavior with respect to their private information, this
can be explained as follows. Firstly, as time gets closer to the end of the trading day
informed traders have less scope to use their private information. Secondly, the impact
of their trades has less long lasting effect on the liquidity. The intensity of the traders’
trading decreases with σ2ε (this also includes the traders’ behavior at the late auctions). As
said before, in the early auctions we observe that traders are not comparatively aggressive
in their trading. As the noise in their information is not too high, traders refrain from
trading too early as trading aggressively would lead to their private information being
incorporated in the price early. However, when the level of noise is very high, we only
observe a waiting game. In this case, the high level of noise present in the traders’ signals
reduces the competition between informed traders since expression (4.1) is close to zero
in that case. Indeed, when σ2ε is high, traders have initially more dispersed information
reducing the correlation between the traders signals. This in turn limits the competition
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between traders during all the periods of trading as this conditional correlation remains
low.
The waiting game observed in our model is not due to a negative correlation between
the signals as a consequence of trading. We show that, in our model, the waiting game
phase appears when the correlation between the signals of the traders is low - but positive.
In our model, increasing the level of noise in the traders signals decreases the correlation
between these signals. Then, we have for a high level of noise:
Corr(S˜i, S˜j)n ≈ 0. (4.2)
Hence, in this case, each trader considers that the information from other traders is
completely uncorrelated to the true value of the asset. Therefore, he limits his orders
during the early periods of trading in order to not reveal his private information and waits
for the last periods to submit more significant orders.9
Figures 11 and 12 show that, for low levels of noise, we only observe a rat race during
all the periods of trading: we can see from these figures that the traders’ reaction to their
information increases rapidly during all the periods of trading. We also observe that the
slope of the parameter αn (which measures the intensity of competition) increases during
all the periods of trading and more significantly in the lasts periods. This result generalizes
the findings of Kyle (1985) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) in the case of signals
with low levels of noise.
Figures 11 and 12 also show that, for intermediate levels of noise, we observe a waiting
game that lasts most of the auctions as the trading intensity dramatically increases in the
last auctions. The Figures also show that the intensity of that rat race decreases with the
level of noise. Hence, for very high levels of noise, we only observe a waiting game that
lasts for all the periods of trading.10 The main difference with Foster and Viswanathan
9In this case, we can compare our model to the one of Kyle (1985), since each informed trader considers
other traders as noise traders, and so follows a strategy comparable to that observed in Kyle (1985).
10In fact, we always observe a rat race at the last auctions. However, the intensity of this rat race
decreases with the level of noise and becomes difficult to observe when the level of noise is too high.
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(1996) is the order in which the two game stages can appear.
Figure 11: Reaction of an informed investor
to his private signal (αn) over time, M = 2,
N = 20, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 12: Reaction of an informed investor
to his private signal (αn) over time, M = 2,
N = 100, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
When we analyze the effect of increasing the number of auctions on the previous result,
we obtain the following results. As an overall, increasing the number of auctions increases
the traders’ aggressiveness in each auction. For a very low level of noise and when increasing
the number of auctions, we still have a rat race during all the periods of trading.11 We also
observe that the intensity of the rat race increases with the number of auctions.12 When
increasing the number of auctions for a high level of noise, a waiting game takes place for
most of the auctions. We also obtain that increasing the number of auctions increases the
intensity of the rat race observed in the last auctions.
When we analyze the effect of increasing the number of insiders on the previous result,
we obtain the following results. For a very low level of noise, we still have one phase only,
i.e. the rat race. The results show that the intensity of this rat race increases with the
11The simulations show that the range of σ2 for which this result is satisfied becomes smaller and closer
to 0 when the number of periods increases.
12Numerically, we observe higher final values of αn when we increase the number of auctions N , and keep
σ constant.
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Figure 13: Reaction of an informed investor
to his private signal (αn) over time, M = 10,
N = 20, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 14: Reaction of an informed investor
to his private signal (αn) over time, M = 10,
N = 100, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
number of insiders.13 We obtain that, for high levels of noise, the competition is distorted
as follows: we have an early and a late rat race with a waiting game occurring between
those two rat races. The intensity of the early rate race increases with the number of
insiders as well as with the number of auctions. It also increases when signals become
more precise (see Figures 13 and 14). The intensity of the final rat race decreases with the
number of traders.
4.3 Profit
In this section, we are interested in understanding how the competition between the insiders
affects their profits.
Numerical result 4 1. The introduction of the noise in the traders’ signals reduces
the profits when the level of the overall competition is low, measured by both the
temporal and the spatial competition i.e. when M = 2 and N < 7, or M = 3 and
N < 3, or M = 4 and N = 1.
13These results are obtained for a range of very low levels of noise, this range gets narrower when the
number of insiders increases.
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2. When the level of competition is high (M = 2 and N ≥ 7, or M = 3 and N ≥ 3 or
M = 4 and N ≥ 2, or M ≥ 5 and for any N), the traders’ profits are non-monotonic
with the level of noise. More precisely, the profits intially increase with low level of
noise and then decrease with it for high value of the noise.
Figure 15: The individual profit (pii) as a
function of σ2ε for M = 2, the number of
insiders, N = 3, the number of auctions,
σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 16: The individual profit (pii) as a
function of σ2ε for M = 4, the number of
insiders, N = 10, the number of auctions,
σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
These results can be explained as follows. Introducing noise in the traders’ signals
diminishes the intensity of the competition and so allows the traders to get greater profits
(Figure 16). However, too much noise decreases the trader’s trading intensity in such a
way that traders switch to a waiting game and so diminishes the profits. Noise acts as a
commitment not to trade. When the competition is low (measured by both N and M),
only the negative effect of the noise is present (Figure 15).
4.4 Optimal noise
In this section, we look at the optimal level of noise, σ2 maximizing the informed traders’
expected profit. Our previous results show that the presence of noise in the private signals
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may reduce the level of competition between informed traders. This would lead to higher
expected profits.
Numerical result 5 There exists an optimal level of noise which maximizes the expected
profits of the traders when the number of insiders is relatively high. We show numerically
that this level increases with the number of insiders, that the optimal individual profit
decreases with M and that the optimal aggregate profit converges to a finite positive value
when M increases infinitely.
These results are shown in Figures 17, 18 and 19.
Figure 17: The individual profit (pii) as a
function of σ2ε for N = 4, the number of auc-
tions, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 18: The individual profit (pii) as a
function of σ2ε for N = 4, the number of auc-
tions, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figures 17 and 18 show the individual profit for different values of the number of
insiders. We obtain that the optimal level of noise, i.e. the level of noise maximizing the
traders’ expected profit, increases with the number of auctions. We also observe that the
optimal individual profit, computed as the profit obtained from the first auction to the
last evaluated at the optimal amount of noise, decreases with the number of insiders. This
result is similar to the one obtained by Dridi and Germain (2009).
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Figure 19: The aggregate profit (piAgg) as a
function of σ2ε for N = 4, the number of auc-
tions, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 20: The individual profit (pii) as a
function of σ2ε for M = 2, the number of in-
siders, σ2u = 1, Σ0 = 1.
Figure 19 shows that the expected aggregate profit (individual profit aggregated over
the number of traders) does not go to zero when M is large, but instead tends to a finite
positive value. This result is similar to the one obtained by Dridi and Germain (2009).
The next result exhibits the effects of increasing the number of auctions on the traders
expected profits.
Numerical result 6 The optimal level of noise increases with the number of auctions.14
For a fixed level of noise, the individual profits decrease with the number of auctions N
for low levels of noise, whereas it increases with the number of auctions for high levels of
noise. We also obtain that the optimal individual profit converges to a finite positive value
when N increases infinitely.
These results are shown numerically in Figure 20.
The previous result can be explained as follows: as we increase the number of auctions,
the informed traders scope of profit increases. However, when the level of noise is low,
the profit decreases with the number of auctions since, in this case, the traders’ private
14We observe numerically that the optimal level of noise increases with N slower than with M .
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information is quickly incorporated in the price which then converges quickly to the true
value of the asset. When the level of noise is relatively high, less information is revealed
to the market maker and so the price does not converge as quickly to the true value of the
asset allowing the traders to obtain larger profits.
5 Conclusion
This article analyzes the introduction of heterogeneous noisy signals when strategic insiders
compete in a multi-auction market. In this case, when all informed agents are endowed with
signals of the same precision, we derive the unique linear equilibrium and its properties.
We find that the existence of an equilibrium is not always guaranteed. The existence
condition implies a negative relationship between the number of auctions and the noise
in the traders’ private signal. The existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed when the
competition is limited through noisy signals.
Our model also enables us to analyze the trade-off between noise and competition as in
Dridi and Germain (2009). We show that when the competition is strong (the number of
informed traders and/or the number of auctions is high), noisy information can reduce the
competition between insiders and can increase their expected profits. In that case noise
acts as a commitment not to trade.In the case of an intense competition, a low level of
noise reduces the competition between traders and leads to greater profits. For a weak
competition (the number of informed traders and the number of auctions are low), the
introduction of some noise in the traders’ signals always leads to a drop in their expected
profits. We then obtain a result which is similar to Dridi and Germain (2009).
With an intense competition, there exists an optimal level of noise that maximizes the
expected profits of the traders. We obtain that this level increases indefinitely with the
number of traders and the number of auctions. We also obtain, as in Dridi and Germain
(2009), that the optimal aggregate profit has a strictly positive finite limit when the number
of traders is large. Moreover, the optimal individual profit has a strictly positive finite limit
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when the number of auctions is large.
Furthermore, when the level of the noise is small leading to a strong correlation between
signals, the competition between traders takes the form of a rat race during all the periods
of trading. However, as we increase the level of noise, a waiting game phase appears during
the early periods of trading, and the intensity of the rat race of the last auctions decreases.
Hence, when the level of the noise is too large (implying that the correlation is weak) we
only observe a waiting game. This result is in sharp contrast with Foster and Viswanathan
(1996).
Our paper broadly agrees with the findings of Kyle (1985) where the traders gradually
incorporates their information into price. We find that traders trade very aggressively at
the last auction, as in Kyle (1985), however we do observe an auction where they refrain
from trading and even decrease their trading intensity. One empirical prediction of this
model is that changes in volume during the trading day can be explained by the presence
of noise in the information of the traders when they compete in the market. It would
be difficult to test this model empirically as we don’t have access to the profit and the
information of traders in banks. Nevertheless, we could design an experiment where the
level of noise is controlled and the profit of the players measured during the trading game.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof involves four steps. We will start by resolving the dimensionality issue (we
avoid the problem of increasing state history with time) when all traders follow their
optimal strategies. In the second step, we resolve the dimensionality issue when one trader
deviates from his optimal strategy, conjecture the value function and then obtain the first
order condition (FOC) that determines the equilibrium. In the third step, we show with
a lemma that, at the equilibrium, the parameters of the demand function for insider i do
not depend on i. In other words, at the equilibrium, all insiders have the same reaction to
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their private information (αn) and to their public information (βn). Finally, in the fourth
step, we derive the insiders’ backward induction program.
Step 1: The Dimensionality Issue
In this section we show how the dimensionality issue is resolved (i.e. we avoid the problem
of increasing state history with time). As in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), we look at
linear strategies for informed traders and learning by the market maker.
Consider trader i who is interested in forecasting the true value of the asset that is not
predicted by the market after n− 1 periods of trading, using his information
(S˜i, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1). By equation (3.4), it can be shown that:
pn = p0 +
n∑
k=1
λkw˜k. (6.1)
Trader i’s order for r = 1, . . . , n− 1 can be rewritten as:
x˜ir = αir∆trS˜i + βr∆trpr−1 = αir∆trS˜i + βr∆tr(p0 +
r−1∑
k=1
λkw˜k). (6.2)
It is then clear that (x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1) is redundant and the meaningful history for trader i
is just (S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1). It is important to note that this only holds when trader i plays
his conjectured optimal strategy in past periods. In developing this result, we exploit the
fact that optimal strategies are functions of the private signal S˜i, and the order flow up to
that point. Thus trader i predicts v˜ − pn−1 as follows:
E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1]
= E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i − pn−1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1]
= E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i − pn−1]
= an(S˜i − pn−1).
We can then deduce that S˜i − pn−1 is a sufficient statistic for trader i to predict the
value of the asset after n − 1 trading periods. In deriving this result, we first use the
fact that in equilibrium (x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1) is redundant given (S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1). Then, we
use the result that when we project v˜ and S˜i on (w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1) we obtain pn−1, so both
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v˜ − pn−1 and S˜i − pn−1 are independent of (w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1). Trader i is also interested in
predicting the signals of the other informed traders, as they use their signals to submit
orders, which in turn determine market price. Because trader j submits an order of the
form x˜jn = αjn∆tnS˜j + βn∆tpn−1, trader i needs to predict S˜j . This is done as follows:
E[S˜j |S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1] = E[S˜j − pn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1] + pn−1
= E[S˜j − pn−1|S˜i − pn−1, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1] + pn−1
= E[S˜j − pn−1|S˜i − pn−1] + pn−1
= E[v˜ + ˜j − pn−1|S˜i − pn−1] + pn−1
= E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i − pn−1] + pn−1
= an(S˜i − pn−1) + pn−1.
So (S˜i−pn−1, pn−1) is a sufficient statistic for trader i to predict S˜j , and there is no history-
dependent hierarchy of forecasts. The above discussion shows how the dimensionality issue
is resolved in our model when all traders submit their optimal orders. However, we must
also consider deviations from the optimal strategy by any one trader (keeping the behavior
of other traders fixed). If trader i submits an arbitrary order sequence (x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1),
which is different from the equilibrium orders (given by equation (3.3)), the sufficient
statistics that we have computed need not be relevant.15 In the next step, we resolve
the dimensionality issue when one trader deviates from his optimal strategy (keeping the
strategies of other traders fixed) and find the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
equilibrium. This finishes step 1 of the proof.
Step 2: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions For Equilibrium.
Suppose that all traders other than trader i play their conjectured equilibrium strategy
and the market maker updates her beliefs using the linear rules described above. Now
consider what happens if trader i has submitted arbitrary orders in the first n− 1 periods
(x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1). To solve the model in this setting, we first need to construct the following
15In particular S˜i − pn−1 is not orthogonal to (w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1) since pn−1 6= E[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1] because
trader i has not played his optimal strategy in the first n− 1 rounds of trading.
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statistics based on trader i’s information from the first n − 1 periods. These statistics
correspond to the outcomes that would have occurred had trader i used the equilibrium
strategy instead of the arbitrary strategy in the first n − 1 periods. For each informed
trader, we recursively define:
wˆin =
M∑
j=1
(αjn∆tS˜j + βn∆tpˆ
i
n−1) + ∆un,
pˆin = p0 +
n∑
k=1
λkwˆ
i
k,
where wˆin is the order flow that would have occurred in the n
th round of trading if trader
i had followed the equilibrium strategy (xˆi0, . . . , xˆin−1) in the first n periods of trading.
Similarly, after n rounds of trading, pˆin is the price that prevails in the n
th round of trading
if trader i had followed the equilibrium strategy (xˆi0, . . . , xˆin−1) in the first n periods of
trading.
We can prove by mathematical induction that (wˆik, pˆ
i
k) is in the information set of trader i
(S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1). Hence, trader i knows the change in the order flow and
the market maker’s expectation of the liquidation value of the asset.
As in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), the price deviation from equilibrium caused by past
suboptimal play is the additional variable that is needed to summarize the history observed
by trader i:
E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[v˜ − pˆin−1 + pˆin−1 − pn−1|S˜i,
w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[v˜ − pˆin−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
+pˆin−1 − pn−1 = E[v˜ − pˆin−1|S˜i, wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] + pˆin−1 − pn−1
= an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1 − pn−1.
Here, we use the fact that pˆin−1 − pn−1 is in the information set of trader i and that
(S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1) can be constructed from (S˜i, wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1).
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We also have:
E[S˜j |S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[S˜j − pˆn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1,
x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] + pˆn−1 = an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1.
Hence, we find that (S˜i − pˆin−1, pˆin−1 − pn−1, pˆin−1) is a sufficient statistic to forecast the
liquidation value and the signals of other traders. Now, we conjecture the value function
of trader i after n− 1 to be:
piin = k1,n−1S˜2i + k2,n−1S˜ipn−1 + k3,n−1p
2
n−1 + k4,n−1pn−1(pˆ
i
n−1 − pn−1)
+k5,n−1S˜i(pˆin−1 − pn−1) + k6,n−1(pˆin−1 − pn−1)2 + δn−1.
We also conjecture the optimal strategy of a trader who has played an arbitrary strategy:
x˜ik = αik∆tkS˜i + βk∆tkpk−1 + ζk∆tk(pˆik−1 − pk−1).
One can consider the profit which is realized at the nth auction, and what remains to be
gained from the next auction to the end of trading. This is given below:
E[piin|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[(v˜−pn)x˜in+pin+1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1].
This leads to the following expression
E[piin|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = I + II,
with
I = E[x˜in(v˜ − pn)|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1],
II = E[piin+1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1].
The price at auction n is given by
pn = pn−1 + λn(∆X˜n + ∆u˜n),
with ∆X˜n = x˜in + ∆X
∗
n the aggregate order flow from the demand of the ith insider (x˜in)
and from the M − 1 other informed participants (∆X∗n) at the nth auction.
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Since ∆u˜n is independent of v˜, we obtain
E[∆u˜n|p1, . . . , pn−1, S˜i] = E[∆u˜n] = 0.
We have already shown that:
E[v˜|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1. (6.3)
Due to normality, we have the standard formula:
an =
cov(v˜, S˜i|wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1)
var(S˜i|wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1)
=
cov(v˜, v˜ + ˜i|p1, . . . , pn−1)
var(v˜ + ˜i|p1, . . . , pn−1) .
Then, we obtain:
E[v˜|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = Σn−1
Σn−1 + σ2
(S˜i−pˆin−1)+pˆin−1 = an(S˜i−pˆin−1)+pˆin−1,
with an =
Σn−1
Σn−1+σ2
and Σn−1 = var(v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1) being the error variance of price at
the (n− 1)th auction.
We then compute the two terms of the profit I and II
I = x˜inE[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
−λnx˜inE[∆X∗n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]− λnx˜2in,
II = E[k1,nS˜
2
i + k2,nS˜ipn + k3,np
2
n + k4,npn(pˆ
i
n − pn) + k5,nS˜i(pˆni
−pn) + k6,n(pˆin − pn)2 + δn|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1].
Given that
pn = pn−1 + λn(x˜in + ∆X∗n + ∆u˜n),
pˆin = pˆ
i
n−1 + λn(xˆin + ∆Xˆ
∗
n + ∆u˜n),
we obtain:
pˆin − pn = pˆin−1 − pn−1 + λn(xˆin − x˜in) + λn(∆Xˆ∗n −∆X∗n)
= pˆin−1 − pn−1 + λnxˆin − λnx˜in + (M − 1)λnβn∆t(pˆin−1 − pn−1)
= [1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t](pˆin−1 − pn−1) + λnxˆin − λnx˜in.
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The second term II can be rewritten as
II = k1,nS˜
2
i + k2,nS˜ipn−1 + k2,nλnS˜iE[∆X
∗
n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] + k2,nλnS˜ix˜in
+k3,nE[(pn−1 + λn∆X∗n + λnx˜in + λn∆u˜n)
2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
+k4,n[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t]pn−1(pˆin−1 − pn−1) + k4,nλnpn−1(xˆin − x˜in)
+k4,nλnx˜in[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t](pˆin−1 − pn−1) + k4,nλ2nx˜in(xˆin − x˜in)
+k4,nλn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t](pˆin−1 − pn−1)E[∆X∗n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
+k4,nλ
2
n(xˆin − x˜in)E[∆X∗n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
+k5,n[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t]S˜i(pˆin−1 − pn−1)
+k5,nλnS˜i(xˆin − x˜in) + k6,n(pˆin − pn)2 + δn.
The ith informed trader chooses his market order xin that maximizes his future expected
profit. Thus, the first order condition (FOC) implies that:
E[v˜ − pn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]− λnE[∆X∗n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
E[k2,nλnS˜i + 2λnk3,npn + k4,n[λn(pˆ
i
n − pn)− λnpn]− λnk5,nS˜i − 2k6,nλn(pˆin − pn)
|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]− 2λnx˜in = 0.
Moreover, we can directly derive the second order condition:
λn[1− λn(k3n − k4,n + k6n)] > 0.
Given the linearity of the traders’ market order, the aggregate order flow of the j 6= i other
informed participants is ∆X∗n =
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆tS˜j + (M − 1)βn∆tpn−1, we have:
E[
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆tS˜j + (M − 1)βn∆tpn−1|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] =
(an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1)(
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆t) + (M − 1)βn∆tpn−1.
This leads to the following expression for the FOC:
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an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1 − pn−1 − λn(an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1)(
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆t)
−λn(M − 1)βn∆tpn−1 + k2nλnS˜i + 2λnk3n(pn−1 + λnx˜in + λn[(an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1)
(
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆t) + (M − 1)βn∆tnpn−1]) + k4nλn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t](pˆin−1 − pn−1)
+k4nλ
2
n(xˆin − x˜in)− k4nλn(pn−1 + λnx˜in + λn[(an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1)
(
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆t) + (M − 1)βn∆tnpn−1])− k5nλnS˜i
−2k6nλn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t](pˆin−1 − pn−1)− 2k6nλ2n(xˆin − x˜in)− 2λnx˜in = 0.
The FOC can be rewritten as:
S˜i[an − 2λn(1− λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n))αin∆t+ λn(k2n − k5n) + λnan(2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− 1)
(
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t)] + pn−1[−an + 2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− (M + 1− 2Mλn(k3n − 1
2
k4n))λnβn∆t
−λn(1− an)(1− 2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n))(
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t)] + (pˆ
i
n−1 − pn−1)[1− an
+(1− an)λn(2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− 1)(
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t) + 2λn(βn + ζn)∆t(λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− 1)
−2λ2nβn∆t(M − 1)(k6n −
1
2
k4n) + 2λ
2
nζn∆t(k6n −
1
2
k4n)− 2λn(k6n − 1
2
k4n)] = 0.
By identification, the coefficients multiplied by S˜i, pn−1 and pˆin−1− pn−1 must be equal to
zero. This leads to:
an−2λn[1−λn(k3n−1
2
k4n)]αin∆t+λn(k2n−k5n)+λnan[2λn(k3n−1
2
k4n)−1](
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆tn) = 0.
After some further simplifications we obtain
−an + 2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− [M + 1− 2Mλn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)]λnβn∆t
−λn(1− an)[1− 2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)](
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t) = 0,
and
1− an + (1− an)λn[2λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− 1](
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t) + 2λn(βn + ζn)∆t[λn(k3n − 1
2
k4n)− 1]
−2λ2nβn∆t(M − 1)(k6n −
1
2
k4n) + 2λ
2
nζn∆t(k6n −
1
2
k4n)− 2λn(k6n − 1
2
k4n) = 0.
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We then obtain the following relationships for αin, βn and ζn
αin∆t =
an + λn(k2n − k5n)
2λn[1− λn(k3n − 12k4n)]
+ an
2λn(k3n − 12k4n)− 1
2[1− λn(k3n − 12k4n)]
(
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t), (6.4)
βn∆t =
2(k3n − 12k4n)λn − an
(M + 1)λn − 2M(k3n − 12k4n)λ2n
− λn(1− an)[1− 2λn(k3n −
1
2k4n)]
(M + 1)λn − 2M(k3n − 12k4n)λ2n
M∑
j 6=i
αjn∆t,
(6.5)
ζn∆t =
an − 1 + 2λn(k6n − 12k4n)− (1− an)λn[2λn(k3n − 12k4n)− 1](
∑M
j 6=i αjn∆t)
2λn[λn(k3n − 12k4n)− 1] + 2λ2n(k6n − 12k4n)
(6.6)
−2λn[λn(k3n −
1
2k4n)− 1]− 2λ2n(M − 1)(k6n − 12k4n)
2λn[λn(k3n − 12k4n)− 1] + 2λ2n(k6n − 12k4n)
βn∆t.
The first relationship needs to be solved for the αin parameters. Let us define the following
parameters
a′ =
an + λn(k2n − k5n)
2λn[1− λn(k3n − 12k4n)]
, and b′ = −an
2
1− 2λn(k3n − 12k4n)
1− λn(k3n − 12k4n)
.
Given a′ and b′, the relationship (6.4) between the parameters αi can be rewritten as, for
i 6= j
αi = a
′ + b′(
n∑
j 6=i
αj). (6.7)
Step 3: The demand of the insiders.
The Lemma below gives the expression of the αi parameters solving that relationship.
Lemma Let a′ and b′ be two real numbers such as for i 6= j the relationship (6.7) is verified
then, if b′ 6= −1 for i = 1, . . . ,M :
αi =
a′
1− b′(M − 1) .
Proof : We have the following M equalities
α1 = a
′ + b′(α2 + . . .+ αM ),
α2 = a
′ + b′(α1 + α3 + . . .+ αM ),
...
αM = a
′ + b′(α1 + α2 + . . .+ αM−1).
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Let t be a real number such that t =
∑M
i=1 αi, by adding the M previous equalities, we
get:
t = Ma′ + b′(M − 1)t,
t =
Ma′
1− b′(M − 1) .
On the other hand, by considering the difference of the first two equalities we have:
α2 − α1 = b′(α1 − α2).
Hence, we obtain:
α2(1 + b
′) = α1(1 + b′).
Then, if b′ 6= −1, all the real numbers αi are identical.
Therefore, we can conclude for i = 1, . . . ,M :
αi =
a′
1− b′(M − 1) .
It can be verified that the case where b′ = −1, cannot happen due to the second order
condition.
This ends the proof of the lemma.
By applying the lemma, we find the following expression of αin∆t which is independent of
i:
αin∆t = αn∆t =
an + λn(k2n − k5n)
λn
[
2 + (M − 1)an − 2λn(k3n − 12k4n)(1 + an(M − 1))
] .
The expression of βn is given by:
βn∆t =
2(k3n − 12k4n)λn − an
(M + 1)λn − 2M(k3n − 12k4n)λ2n
− M − 1
M
(1− an)(1− 2λn(k3n − 12k4n))
(M + 1)λn − 2M(k3n − 12k4n)λ2n
ψn,
with ψn = Mλnαn∆t .
On the other hand, one obtains the relationship between the error variance of prices at the
nth auction (Σn) and the error variance of prices at the (n− 1)th auction. Indeed:
Σn = var[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n] = var[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1]− cov(v˜, w˜n)
2
var(w˜n)
.
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Hence, one obtains:
Σn = Σn−1 − λncov(v˜, w˜n) = (1−Mλnαn∆t)Σn−1 = (1− ψn)Σn−1.
Since Σn is positive, we have the following condition:
ψn < 1.
Then, an can be written as:
an =
Σn−1
Σn−1 + σ2
=
Σn
Σn + (1− ψn)σ2
.
The error variance of the price at the nth auction, Σn, is equal to:
Σn = var[v˜|w˜1, . . . , w˜n] = Σn−1 −
(αn∆t)
2Σ2n−1M2
(αn∆t)2Σn−1M2 +M(αn∆t)2σ2 + σ2u∆t
,
Σn =
Σn−1(σ2u∆t+ (αn∆t)2Mσ2 )
(αn∆t)2M2Σn−1 + σ2u∆t+ (αn∆t)2Mσ2
.
The market efficiency condition implies that λn is the regression coefficient of v˜ on w˜n,
conditional on w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, then:
λn =
αn∆tMΣn−1
(αn∆tn)2M2Σn−1 + σ2u∆t+ (αn∆tn)2Mσ2
.
This leads to the following expression
λn
Σn
=
Mαn∆t
M(αn∆t)2σ2 + σ
2
u∆t
.
Since αn∆t =
ψn
Mλn
, one obtains:
λ2n =
ψnΣn − ψ
2
nσ
2

M
σ2u∆t
.
That yields the following condition:
Σn > ψn
σ2
M
.
Since Σn ≥ ΣN and ψn < 1, the following condition is sufficient for equilibrium
ΣN >
σ2
M
.
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Step 4: The backward induction program of the insiders.
Each trader i, for i = 1, . . . ,M , solves his maximization problem:
E[piin|p1, . . . , pn−1, S˜i] = k1,n−1S˜2i + k2,n−1S˜ipn−1 + k3,n−1p2n−1 + k4,n−1pn−1(pˆin−1 − pn−1)
+k5,n−1S˜i(pˆin−1 − pn−1) + k6,n−1(pˆin−1 − pn−1)2 + δn−1.
Since each trader uses a backward induction process, we have to find a recurrence relation
between the different parameters:

k1,n−1
k2,n−1
k3,n−1
k4,n−1
k5,n−1
k6,n−1

=

a11,n a12,n a13,n a14,n a15,n a16,n
a21,n a22,n a23,n a24,n a25,n a26,n
a31,n a32,n a33,n a34,n a35,n a36,n
a41,n a42,n a43,n a44,n a45,n a46,n
a51,n a52,n a53,n a54,n a55,n a56,n
a61,n a62,n a63,n a64,n a65,n a66,n


k1,n
k2,n
k3,n
k4,n
k5,n
k6,n

+

c1,n
c2,n
c3,n
c4,n
c5,n
c6,n

.
In order to find the expression of the profit of the ith informed trader, we calculate
E[∆X∗n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] and E[(∆X∗n)2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]. They
are given by
E[∆X∗n|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = (M − 1)αn∆tanS˜i
+(M − 1)[βn∆t+ αn∆tn(1− an)]pn−1 + (M − 1)(1− an)αn∆t(pˆin−1 − pn−1),
and
E[(∆X∗n)
2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[(M − 1)2(βn∆tn)2p2n−1 (6.8)
+(αn∆t)
2(
M∑
j 6=i
S˜j)
2 + 2αn∆tβn∆t(M − 1)pn−1(
M∑
j 6=i
S˜j)|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1].
It remains to calculate E[(
∑M
j 6=i S˜j)
2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]. That expression can
38
be written as:
E[(
M∑
j 6=i
S˜j)
2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[
∑
j 6=i
S˜2j + 2
∑
j<k
S˜jS˜k|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1
, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1].
We then have
E[S˜jS˜k|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[(v˜ + ˜j)(v˜ + ˜k)|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
= E[v˜2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
= E[v˜2|S˜i, wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]
= E[v˜2|S˜i, wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1],
and
V ar(v˜|S˜i, wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1) = V ar(v˜|wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1)−
[Cov(v˜, S˜i|wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1)]2
V ar(S˜i|wˆi1, . . . , wˆin−1)
= Σn−1 −
Σ2n−1
Σn−1 + σ2
= anσ
2
 .
Given the above, we get:
E[S˜jS˜k|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = E[v˜|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1]2 + anσ2(6.9)
= [an(S˜i − pˆin−1) + pˆin−1]2 + anσ2 .
We then obtain that
E[S˜jS˜k|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = a2nS˜2i +(1−an)2p2n−1 +(1−an)2(pˆin−1−pn−1)2
+2(1−an)2pn−1(pˆin−1−pn−1)+2an(1−an)S˜i(pˆin−1−pn−1)+2an(1−an)S˜ipn−1 +anσ2 ,
and
E[S˜2j |S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = a2nS˜2i + (1− an)2p2n−1 + (1− an)2(pˆin−1 − pn−1)2
+2(1−an)2pn−1(pˆin−1−pn−1)+2an(1−an)S˜i(pˆin−1−pn−1)+2an(1−an)S˜ipn−1+(an+1)σ2 .
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Using the two previous expressions to compute (6.9), leads to:
E[(
M∑
j 6=i
S˜j)
2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = a2n(M − 1)2S˜2i + (1− an)2(M − 1)2p2n−1
+ (1− an)2(M − 1)2(pˆin−1 − pn−1)2 + 2(1− an)2(M − 1)2pn−1(pˆin−1 − pn−1)
+2an(1−an)(M−1)2S˜i(pˆin−1−pn−1)+2an(1−an)(M−1)2S˜ipn−1+(M−1)[1+(M−1)an]σ2 .
This is then used to calculate expression (6.8) and leads to
E[(∆X∗n)
2|S˜i, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1, x˜i1, . . . , x˜in−1] = (αn∆tn)2a2n(M − 1)2S˜2i
+(M − 1)2(αn∆t(1− an) + βn∆tn)2p2n−1
+(αn∆t)
2(1− an)2(M − 1)2(pˆin−1 − pn−1)2
+2αn∆t(1− an)(M − 1)2[αn∆tn(1− an)
+βn∆t]pn−1(pˆin−1 − pn−1)
+2an(1− an)(αn∆t)2(M − 1)2S˜i(pˆin−1 − pn−1)
+2anαn∆t(M − 1)2[(1− an)αn∆t
+βn∆t]S˜ipn−1
+(αn∆t)
2(M − 1)[1 + (M − 1)an]σ2 .
We calculate the profit of the ith informed trader by substituting x˜in = αn∆tS˜i+βn∆tpn−1+
ζn∆t(pˆ
i
n−1 − pn−1) in the expression of the profit, and by identification we obtain the dif-
ferent coefficients:
δn−1 = δn + λ2nk3n
[
σ2u∆tn + (M − 1)(αn∆t)2(1 + (M − 1)an)σ2 ]
]
, (6.10)
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a11,n = 1,
a12,n = λn(αn∆t)[1 + (M − 1)an],
a13,n = λ
2
n(αn∆t)
2[1 + (M − 1)an]2,
a22,n = 1 + λnβn∆t+ λn(M − 1)[βn∆t+ αn∆t(1− an)],
a23,n = 2λnαn∆t[1 + an(M − 1)][1 +Mλnβn∆t+ (M − 1)(1− an)λnαn∆tn],
a33,n = [1 + λn((M − 1)αn∆t(1− an) +Mβn∆t)]2,
a43,n = 2λ
2
nαn∆t(1− an)(M − 1)2[αn∆t(1− an) + βn∆t] + 2λ2nβn∆tζn∆t
+2λn(1− an)(M − 1)αn∆t+ 2λnζn∆t+ 2λ2n[(1− an)(M − 1)αn∆tnβn∆t
+(M − 1)ζn∆t(αn∆t(1− an) + βn∆t)],
a44,n = 1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t+ λn(βn∆t− ζn∆t) + λn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t]βn∆t
+λ2nβn∆t(βn∆t− ζn∆t) + λn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆tn](M − 1)[αn∆t(1− an) + βn∆t]
+λ2n(βn∆t− ζn∆t)(M − 1)[αn∆t(1− an) + βn∆t],
a52,n = λn(1− an)(M − 1)αn∆t+ λnζn∆t,
a53,n = 2λ
2
nan(1− an)(αn∆tn)2(M − 1)2 + 2λ2nαn∆tζn∆tn
+2λ2n[(1− an)(M − 1)(αn∆tn)2 + an(M − 1)αn∆tζn∆t],
a54,n = λn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t]αn∆t+ λ2n(βn∆t− ζn∆tn)αn∆t
+λn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t]an(M − 1)αn∆t+ λ2n(βn∆t− ζn∆tn)an(M − 1)αn∆t,
a55,n = 1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t+ λn(βn∆t− ζn∆t),
a63,n = λ
2
n[ζn∆t+ (αn∆tn)(1− an)(M − 1)]2,
a64,n = λn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t]ζn∆t+ λ2nζn∆t(βn∆tn − ζn∆t)
+λn[1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t](1− an)(M − 1)αn∆t
+λ2n(βn∆t− ζn∆tn)(1− an)(M − 1)αn∆t,
a66,n = [(1 + (M − 1)λnβn∆t) + λn(βn∆t− ζn∆t)]2,
and
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
c1n = αn∆t(an − (M − 1)anλnαn∆tn − λnαn∆t),
c2n = an(βn∆t− αn∆t)− λnan(M − 1)αnβn∆t2 − 2λnαnβn∆t2
−λn(M − 1)[βn∆t+ αn∆tn(1− an)]αn∆t,
c3n = −anβn∆t− λn(βn∆tn)2 − λn(M − 1)βn∆t[βn∆tn + αn∆t(1− an)],
c4n = (1− an)βn∆t− anζn∆t− 2λnβn∆tζn∆t− λn[(1− an)(M − 1)αn∆tβn∆t
+(M − 1)ζn∆t(αn∆t(1− an) + βn∆t)],
c5n = (1− an)αn∆t+ anζn∆t− 2λnαn∆tζn∆t− λn[(1− an)(M − 1)(αn∆t)2
+an(M − 1)αn∆tζn∆t],
c6n = (1− an)ζn∆t− λn(ζn∆tn)2 − λn(1− an)(M − 1)αn∆tζn∆tn.
The coefficient of the reaction to private information at the nth auction, αn, is equal
to:
αn∆t =
an + λn(k2n − k5n)
λn
[
2 + (M − 1)an − 2λn(k3n − 12k4n)(1 + an(M − 1))
] .
The equation forψn is given by:
ψn =
Man +Mλn(k2n − k5n)
2 + (M − 1)an − 2λn(k3n − 12k4n)(1 + an(M − 1))
.
By substituting an =
Σn
Σn+(1−ψn)σ2 and λ
2
n =
ψnΣn−ψ
2
nσ
2

M
σ2u∆tn
and developing the previous
equation, we get that ψn is the solution of the following equation of order six:
σ2
M
γ5nψ
6
n + (
σ2
M
γ4n −Σnγ5n)ψ5n + (φ5n +
σ2
M
γ3n −Σnγ4n)ψ4n + (φ4n +
σ2
M
γ2n −Σnγ3n)ψ3n
+ (φ3n +
σ2
M
γ1n − Σnγ2n)ψ2n + (φ2n − Σnγ1n)ψn + φ1n = 0,
with
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
γ1n = M
2(k2n − k5n)2 (Σn+σ
2
 )
2
σ2u∆t
,
γ2n = −2M(k2n − k5n)(σ2 + Σn)M(k2n−k5n)σ
2
−2(k3n− 12k4n)(MΣn+σ2 )
σ2u∆t
,
γ3n =
4(k3n− 12k4n)2σ4+M2(k2n−k5n)2σ4+4M2(k3n− 12k4n)2Σ2n−4M(k2n−k5n)(k3n− 12k4n)Σnσ2
σ2u∆t
−8M(k2n−k5n)σ4 (k3n−
1
2
k4n)+4M2(k2n−k5n)σ2 (k3n− 12k4n)Σn−8(k3n− 12k4n)2MΣnσ2
σ2u∆t
,
γ4n =
4M(k2n−k5n)(k3n− 12k4n)σ4−8(k3n− 12k4n)2σ4−8M(k3n− 12k4n)2Σnσ2
σ2u∆t
,
γ5n =
4(k3n− 12k4n)2σ4
σ2u∆t
,
and 
φ1n = M
2Σ2n,
φ2n = −2MΣn(2σ2 + (M + 1)Σn),
φ3n = 4σ
4
 + 4σ
2
 (M + 1)Σn + (M + 1)
2Σ2n + 4Mσ
2
Σn,
φ4n = −8σ4 − 4σ2Σn(M + 1),
φ5n = 4σ
4
 .
At the final auction there is no future profit, we then have k2N = 0 and k3N = 0. The
parameter ψN is derived from:
φ5Nψ
4
N + φ4Nψ
3
N + φ3Nψ
2
N + φ2NψN + φ1N = 0.
The previous equation can be factorized as:
[2σ2ψ
2
N − (2σ2 + (M + 1)ΣN )ψN +MΣN ]2 = 0.
Hence, the parameter ψN is derived from:
2σ2ψ
2
N − (2σ2 + (M + 1)ΣN )ψN +MΣN = 0.
This ends the proof of proposition 1.
The case of perfect private information: S˜i = v˜
We now illustrate our model when σ2 = 0.
In this case, the demand function of informed trader i at auction n becomes:
xˆin = αn∆tv˜ + βn∆tpˆ
i
n−1, (6.11)
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and his expected profit:
E[piin|pˆi0, . . . , pˆin−1, v˜] = k1,n−1v˜2 + k2,n−1pˆin−1v˜ + k3,n−1pˆin−12 + δn−1. (6.12)
ψn is solution of the following equation:
4(k3n− 12k4n)2Σn
σ2u∆tn
ψ3n + [
4(k2n−k5n)(k3n− 12k4n)Σn
σ2u∆t
− (M+1M )2]ψ2n
+(2M+1M +
Σn(k2n−k5n)2
σ2u∆t
)ψn − 1 = 0.
At the final auction, the parameter ψN is derived from:
−(M + 1
M
)2ψ2N + 2
M + 1
M
ψN − 1 = 0, (6.13)
then:
ψN =
M
M + 1
. (6.14)
The coefficients αn, βn, an and λn are characterized by the following equation:
λN =
√
M
M + 1
ΣN
σ2u∆tn
. (6.15)
Since σ2 = 0, we have an = 1 for n = 1, . . . , N , we then get:
βN∆t = − 1
(M + 1)λN
= −αN∆t. (6.16)
We can prove, by using mathematical induction, that for all
auctions n = 1, . . . , N we have:
βn∆t = −αn∆t = −
1− 2λn(k1n − 12k4n)
λn[M(1− 2λn(k1n − 12k4n) + 1]
, (6.17)
k3n = k1n, (6.18)
k2n = −2k1n. (6.19)
Then, the demand function and the expected profit of informed trader i can be written as:
xˆin = αn∆t(v˜ − pˆin−1), (6.20)
E[piin|pˆi0, . . . , pˆin−1, v˜] = k1n−1(v˜ − pˆin−1)2 + δn−1, (6.21)
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with
δn−1 = δn + λ2nk3nσ
2
u∆t. (6.22)
Furthermore, we have:
λ2n = ψn
Σn
σ2u∆t
= Mλnαn∆t
Σn
σ2u∆t
. (6.23)
Solving the previous expression (6.23) for λn leads to:
λn =
MαnΣn
σ2u
. (6.24)
These equations are similar to those obtained by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
The case of static setting: N = 1
We now illustrate our model for N = 1.
In this case, we have ∆t = 1 and αN satisfies the following equation:
αN =
aN
λN [2 + (M − 1)aN ] .
We also have:
aN =
Σ0
Σ0 + σ2
=
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2

=
1
1 + τ
.
where τ = σ
2

σ2v
. Then, αN can be written as follows:
αN =
1
λN (M + 1 + 2τ)
.
This leads to the fact that λN can be written as:
λN =
√
M
M + 1 + 2τ
√
1 + τ
σv
σu
.
We then obtain:
αN =
σu
σv
1√
M(1 + τ)
.
By substituting αN and λN by their expressions, the value function can be written as
follows:
E[pii0] =
σuσv
√
1 + τ√
M(M + 1 + 2τ)
.
These results are similar to those obtained by Dridi and Germain (2009) when all insiders
have the same level of noise in their signals and there is one auction.
All other Propositions are obtained by numerical procedures.
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